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In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are
moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on
the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for
an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty
reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal
uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty
beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was
not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition,
or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal
uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage.
Within the past decade, there has been an explosion of renewed
interest in goals and their effects on cognition, affect, and behavior
(Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Higgins & Sorrentino, 1990; Sor-
rentino & Higgins, 1986, 1996). Although much of this work
focused on specific goal contents and their affective and behav-
ioral sequelae, a major interest of contemporary theorists and
researchers has been the various cognitive processes involved in
goal-directed action. Individuals (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990;
Weary & Edwards, 1996) working within this more recent tradi-
tion generally have viewed goals as cognitive representations of
desired end states, and they have focused their attention on the
cognitive processes and strategies used in the pursuit of goal
attainment and/or disengagement.
In addition to this focus on the cognitive bases of motivation and
goal pursuit, several investigators (e.g., Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994;
Gifford Weary, Jill A. Jacobson, and Stephanie J. Tobin, Department of
Psychology, Ohio State University; John A. Edwards, Department of
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Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) have begun to focus
on the possible implicit, or automatic, activation of goal-relevant
cognitive structures. These investigators have reasoned that if
goals are represented as cognitive structures, then they, just like
other cognitive structures (e.g., social roles, stereotypes, schemas,
scripts), ought to be capable of automatic activation by environ-
mental stimuli. Consistent with this reasoning, a recent study
reported by Chartrand and Bargh (1996) found that temporarily
primed impression formation or memorization goals produced the
same effects as had explicit manipulations of them.
The present research also focuses on the effects of implicit and
explicit goal activation on cognitive processes. Here, however, we
focus on the activation of what is thought for some perceivers to be
a chronically accessible goal—causal uncertainty reduction
(Weary & Edwards, 1996). Moreover, we examine the effects of
causal uncertainty resolution within the highly consequential con-
text of stereotype usage. Before describing the current research,
however, we will first present an overview of Weary and Ed-
wards's model of causal uncertainty. The model was derived from
Weary and colleagues' work on depressed people's social percep-
tion processes (for reviews see Weary & Gannon, 1996, and
Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993). It also owes an
important intellectual debt to more general models of cognitively
based motivations, and, in particular, to cybernetic or control
theory (Hyland, 1988).
Causality Uncertainty Beliefs and Related Goal Structures
It long has been recognized (Berlyne, 1962; Festinger, 1954;
Kagan, 1972) that people are motivated for survival purposes to
reduce uncertainty about or to be as accurate as possible in their
cognitive understandings of the world. Although several sources of
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uncertainty motives have been identified, Weary and Edwards
(1994, 1996) have argued that there is perhaps no more fundamen-
tal source of such motives than that associated with a failure to
understand the relatively unchanging, underlying causal conditions
for events. That is, people grasp reality and can predict and control
it only by referring transient and variable behavior and events to
the relatively unchanging conditions of the world (Heider, 1958).
Thus, any uncertainty about one's ability to accurately identify
cause and effect relationships can be expected to engender doubt
about one's cognitive constructions and comprehensions of reality
and, correspondingly, about one's ability to exercise effective
control.
The causal uncertainty model builds upon this fundamental need
to know and this need to perceive accurately or at least to reduce
uncertainty about the causes of events. More specifically, Weary
and Edwards (1994, 1996) have argued that there exist chronic
individual differences in causal uncertainty beliefs that are related
to dispositional motives to reduce uncertainty about the social
environment. Certainly, such motives can be domain specific;
however, their model focuses on more generalized, chronic causal
uncertainty beliefs and reduction motives because these can be
expected to exert profound and long-lasting effects on a variety of
cognitive processes and overt behaviors.
In their model, Weary and Edwards (1996) differentiated two
components of the causal uncertainty construct: causal uncertainty
beliefs and causal uncertainty feelings. They defined causal un-
certainty beliefs "as generalized self-constructs about one's uncer-
tain or inadequate understanding or detection of causal relations in
the social world" (Weary & Edwards, 1996, p. 159). Such beliefs
presumably are available for all people, because some exposure to
events of ambiguous or vague causal determination is universal.
However, Weary and Edwards argued that they are more global
and chronically accessible (i.e., persistently high in their activation
potential) for some people.
In particular, Weary and Edwards (1996) contended that people
who possess generalized expectations of response-outcome non-
contingency are more likely to perceive situations as uncontrolla-
ble. Because this assimilative influence of perceivers' generalized
expectancies on the perceptions of often ambiguously caused
social events is thought to occur at an automatic level, perceivers
will have no ready explanation for the perceived noncontingency
and will, as a result, experience doubt about their understanding or
detection of causal forces. Over time, this frequent activation
should lead to more global and chronically accessible causal
uncertainty beliefs (Edwards & Weary, 1998; Jacobson, Weary, &
Edwards, 1999).
Chronic accessibility, however, is not the only factor that de-
termines the likelihood of belief activation. Situational perceptions
and expectations of uncontrollability, task instructions to form an
impression of another person or to focus on the causes of one's
own or another's outcomes, or information relevant to causal
inference processes (e.g., evidence of multiple sufficient causes)
also may momentarily activate chronically accessible and, if suf-
ficiently elaborate, salient, or detailed, even nonchronic causal
uncertainty beliefs.1
Once activated, such beliefs give rise to metacognitive feelings
that are experienced as surprise, bewilderment, or confusion
(Clore, 1992; Weary et al., 1993). These feelings, in turn, alert
perceivers to the unsatisfactory nature of their current states of
causal knowledge. They also automatically activate both a repre-
sentation of a desired state of knowledge and strategies to achieve
that end state. In this case, the desired state is a subjective sense of
accurate causal understanding (Swann, 1984); the accuracy-
motivated strategies generally are thought to entail an effortful,
deliberative, intentional search for and processing of the available
diagnostic social information (Edwards, 1998; Weary & Jacobson,
1997). Finally, it is important to note that Weary and Edwards also
suggest that this accuracy goal and its accompanying cognitive
strategies can be activated consciously or they may become active
relatively automatically after frequent activation or pairings with
situational cues.
Causal Uncertainty Beliefs and Stereotype Usage
Perhaps the dominant view of stereotypes is that they are a set
of descriptive beliefs that generally are thought to be characteristic
of members of some social category. When a target is categorized
as belonging to a given group, these beliefs are activated. More-
over, when the available and applicable target information is
ambiguous, when the information-processing objective is com-
plex, when perceivers have a need to simplify the available infor-
mation, and/or when perceivers are unmotivated to engage in
careful processing, such stereotypic beliefs may influence perceiv-
ers' impressions of and reactions to the target (Bodenhausen,
Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987;
Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths,
1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Van Knippenberg,
Dijksterhuis, & Vermeulen, 1999).
This social-cognitive perspective and associated research on
stereotyping, then, have endorsed a cognitive miser portrait of
stereotypers, suggesting that they "categorize because it requires
too much mental effort to individuate" (Fiske, 1989, p. 253). Given
this portrait, it is not surprising that researchers recently have
begun to examine the effect that individual differences in the
expenditure of cognitive effort have in stereotyping (Bodenhausen
& Lichtenstein, 1987; Crawford & Skowronski, 1998; Neuberg &
Newsom, 1993; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O'Brien, 1995).
What role might causal uncertainty play in the use of stereo-
types? The causal uncertainty model suggests that those individ-
uals whose causal uncertainty beliefs are likely to be activated
should, in general, be more motivated to understand the social
world and to form accurate impressions.2 As a result, they should
be more likely to process social information in a thoughtful and
systematic, rather than a heuristic, fashion. They should attend to
and attempt to integrate into their impressions and judgments all
information that they perceive to be diagnostic (Fiske & Neuberg,
1
 Although the causal uncertainty construct may appear superficially to
bear some resemblance to the concept of uncertainty orientation (Sor-
rentino & Short, 1986), the two theoretically are thought to be and, in fact,
empirically have been shown to be unrelated, r = .07 (Walker & Sor-
rentino, 2000). Interested readers should see Weary and Edwards (1996)
for a complete treatment of this issue.
2
 We make no claims here about the actual accuracy or inaccuracy of
stereotypes. Our use of the term accuracy refers to a subjective accuracy
goal of perceivers (Swann, 1984). We do, however, hold that stereotypes
are consensually shared beliefs, and we establish this characteristic of the
particular stereotype used in the current research for our sample.
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1990). To the degree that the available information is ambiguous
(i.e., contains cues both consistent and inconsistent with the default
hypothesis), the influence of available stereotypes on target judg-
ments, then, should be lessened for those perceivers who possess
temporarily or chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs.
This hypothesis was investigated in three different studies, all of
which examined stereotype usage in a situation analogous to a
criminal justice setting. In the first study, we examined the use of
stereotypes by participants whose chronically accessible causal
uncertainty beliefs should have been activated by task instructions.
In Study 2, we examined the roles of both implicit chronic and an
explicit temporary manipulation of uncertainty resolution (i.e.,
accuracy) goals on stereotype usage. In Study 3, we investigated a
key notion of the causal uncertainty model—namely, that activa-
tion of available, but nonchronic, as well as chronic causal uncer-
tainty beliefs should result in similar motivated information-
processing strategies. Specifically, in this study, we examined the
effects of both chronic and primed causal uncertainty beliefs on
participants' use of available stereotype information. Finally, in an
attempt to rule out alternative explanations for any obtained find-
ings, all studies included assessments of individual difference
variables known to be related to causal uncertainty (Weary &
Edwards, 1994, 1996).
Study 1
The general procedure for all three studies followed closely that
of Bodenhausen and his colleagues (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994,
Experiment 4). Briefly, as part of a study of legal socialization,
participants were asked to read a disciplinary case that was adju-
dicated at another university and to make decisions about the
defendant's guilt. The case involved an allegation of cheating on
an exam and presented ambiguous evidence. For half of the par-
ticipants, the accused student was identified as a member of a
group stereotypically associated with the alleged offense (stereo-
type information condition); for the remainder of the participants,
the student was not so identified (no-stereotype condition). After
reading the case, all participants were asked to report on the
likelihood of the student's guilt.
Past work using this paradigm has shown that the experimental
context and instructions are not so motivating that all perceivers
engage in careful processing of the case information and avoid use
of the stereotype. We expected, then, that participants low in
causal uncertainty would see the stereotyped compared to the
nonstereotyped target as more guilty. However, because individ-
uals who possess chronic and global causal uncertainty beliefs
should be more likely to have their beliefs activated by the task
instructions (i.e., to assume the role of disciplinary decision maker
in the adjudication of the misconduct case), they also should be
more likely to have associated accuracy goals activated. Past
research has shown that temporary increases in accuracy motiva-
tion are associated with reduced stereotyping (e.g., Stangor &
Ford, 1992). Accordingly, we expected that participants who were
high in causal uncertainty would show no differences in their




In partial fulfillment of their course requirements, 174 introductory
psychology students (96 women, 77 men, and 1 person who failed to report
gender) participated in this study. Random assignment by sequential blocks
was used to assign participants to one of the two stereotype information
conditions. Three participants were excluded because they correctly
guessed the purpose of the experiment. Consequently, the final analyses
were conducted using the remaining 171 participants (94 women, 76 men,
and 1 unspecified).
Instruments
Causal Uncertainty Scale. The Causal Uncertainty Scale (CUS; Weary
& Edwards, 1994) measures chronic individual differences in causal un-
certainty beliefs. Participants' responses to the 14 statements that comprise
the scale can range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6), and the
responses are summed to provide a total score; higher numbers indicate
greater causal uncertainty. Sample items from the scale include: "When I
receive poor grades, I usually do not understand why I did so poorly";
"When I see something good happen to others, I often do not know why it
happened"; and "I often feel like I do not have enough information to come
to a conclusion about why things happen to me." The scale has been shown
to have high internal consistency (Cronbach's a = .83) and a 6-week
test-retest reliability from .62 to .80 (see Edwards, Weary, & Reich, 1998,
and Weary & Edwards, 1994, for reviews of the psychometric and con-
struct validation evidence for this scale).
The mean CUS score in the current study was 38.87 (SD = 10.28). To
determine whether participants in the two stereotype conditions differed in
terms of their level of causal uncertainty, their CUS scores were regressed
on the stereotype information condition variable (effects coded so that the
stereotype condition = 1 and the no-stereotype condition = -1 ) . This
analysis revealed no CUS differences as a function of stereotype condition,
|3 = .06, ((169) = 0.83, p = .41.
Differential Emotions Scale. An adaptation (Cacioppo, Martzke, Petty,
& Tassinary, 1988) of the Differential Emotions Scale (DES) was used to
measure positive and negative state affect. Participants' responses to the
eight sets of affect words that comprise the scale can range from 1 (not at
alt) to 7 {very strongly). After the two positive items are reverse scored, the
responses are summed to provide a total score; higher numbers indicate
greater negative affect. Sample items include "warmhearted/joyful/elated,"
"sad/downhearted/blue," and "irritated/angry/mad." The mean DES score
in the current study was 21.71 (SD = 7.03). In addition, a regression
analysis indicated that participants in the stereotype condition compared to
those in the no-stereotype condition reported slightly more negative affect,
/3 = .14, ((169) = 1.83, p = .07.
Need for Cognition Scale. The short form of the Need for Cognition
Scale (NCS; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) was used in the current
experiment to assess individual differences in people's tendency to engage
in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity. Participants' responses to the 18
statements that the scale comprises can range from extremely uncharac-
teristic (1) to extremely characteristic (5). After nine items are reverse
scored, the responses are summed to yield a total score; higher numbers
indicate a greater need for cognition (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis, 1996, for a review of the psychometric and construct validation
evidence for this scale). The mean NCS score for the current study
was 59.96 (SD = 11.93). There were no NCS differences as a function of
stereotype condition, fi = .04, ((169) = 0.57, p = .57.
Personal Need for Structure Scale. The Personal Need for Structure
Scale (PNS; M. M. Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1992) measures
chronic individual differences in the desire for simple structure. The
response options for each item range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (6). Participants' responses were summed across the 11 items (after






Figure 1. Study 1: The regression of target guilt ratings on Causal
Uncertainty Scale (CUS) scores and stereotype information condition.
three responses were reverse scored) to provide a total score; higher
numbers indicated a greater need for simple structure (see Neuberg &
Newsom, 1993, for a review of the psychometric and construct validation
evidence for this scale). The PNS mean in the current sample was 39.22
(SD = 7.82). Additionally, a regression analysis revealed no PNS differ-
ences as a function of stereotype condition, j3 = - .10, f(169) = -1.24,
p = .22.
Procedure
The current experiment was conducted on computers, and groups of 4
participants were run simultaneously, albeit in individual cubicles. After
participants were seated, the experimenter told them that they should
follow the instructions on the computer screen. When they finished an-
swering some demographic questions (e.g., age and gender), participants
were given the initial instructions that explained that the study was an
investigation of legal socialization that was focused specifically on stu-
dents as disciplinary decision makers.
Next, participants were provided with additional instructions that ex-
plained that they would be reading a case in which a student from another
university had been accused of a wrongdoing. They were told that they
would be asked to answer some questions about this case. They then read
a one-paragraph summary of a case in which a student was accused by his
professor of cheating on a math exam. In the stereotype condition, partic-
ipants were informed that the student was an athlete (specifically, a
track-and-field star); in the no-stereotype condition, this information was
excluded. Except for this piece of information, the case summaries were
identical. A pilot study demonstrated that high and low causal uncertainty
students equally viewed student athletes as more likely to cheat on a test
than members of various other collegiate and ethnic groups (e.g., fraternity
member, student government member, Hispanic American male). Student
athletes also were rated by both high and low causal uncertainty students
as being significantly more likely to cheat on a test than to commit nearly
any other infraction (e.g., physically attacking a roommate, selling drugs,
stealing CDs).
The participants next answered a series of questions, presented in ran-
dom order, about the case and their perceptions of the accused student. The
primary dependent measure, an 11-point rating scale of the likelihood that
the student was guilty of cheating on the math exam, was embedded among
these questions. Higher ratings on this scale indicated a greater likelihood
of guilt. After responding to the questions, all participants provided a
separate, open-ended response regarding their perceptions of the study's
purpose. Next, they completed a rating scale that was designed to tap their
processing goal. Finally, they were presented with the series of randomly
ordered scales (i.e., CUS, NCS, PNS, and DES). After the participants had
completed the scales, they were given a written debriefing and an oppor-
tunity to ask any questions.
Results
Measure of Perceived Guilt
To test whether causal uncertainty moderated the influence
of stereotype information on guilt judgments, we conducted a
simultaneous multiple regression analysis. In this analysis, the
participants' guilt likelihood ratings were regressed onto their
standardized continuous CUS scores, the effects-coded stereotype
condition variable, and the product of the standardized and the
coded variable that represented the two-way interaction. As rec-
ommended by Aiken and West (1991), the continuous variable was
standardized prior to the analysis for two purposes. First, similar to
centering the continuous measure, this additive transformation
reduces the multicollinearity between the main effect and its
product term, the interaction. Second, unlike centering, this trans-
formation results in the appropriate standardized solution for the
interaction term and the simple slopes associated with the interac-
tion when one uses the regression coefficient from the unstand-
ardized solution (Friedrich, 1982). The coded variable was, of
course, not transformed.
As predicted, the Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype Information
interaction was significant, /3 = - . 33 , ?(167) = -2.63, p = .009.
To examine this interaction further, we evaluated the effect of the
stereotype manipulation on guilt ratings at three levels of causal
uncertainty: high (1 SD above the standardized CUS score mean =
1), moderate (at the standardized CUS score mean = 0), and low
(1 SD below the standardized CUS score mean = —1). These
simple slopes tests are consistent with the simple effect compari-
sons reported in previous research using this paradigm, and they
control for any baseline differences that might be associated with
levels of causal uncertainty.
At high and moderate levels of causal uncertainty, participants
who read that the accused individual was an athlete did not differ
in their ratings of the student's guilt from those who did not
receive this category membership information, j3 = —.15,
f(167) = -134, p = .18, and £ = 0.06, f(167) = 0.74, p = .46,
respectively. At low levels of causal uncertainty, however, partic-
ipants who received, compared to those who did not receive, the
stereotype information rated the student as more likely to be guilty,
13 = 0.26, f(167) = 2.40, p < .02 (see Figure 1). 3
3
 As a check that both high and low causal uncertainty participants were
encoding the category membership detail, we asked participants at the end
of the study to recall as many details of the case summary as possible.
Chi-square analyses of the number of participants who spontaneously
mentioned that the defendant was a track star were similar across causal
uncertainty levels, ^ ( 1 , N = 84) = .23,p — .23. Additionally, the number
of stereotype information condition participants who mentioned the cate-
gory information (60%) tended to be greater than chance, ^ ( l , N =
84) = 3.25, p = .07. This number likely would have been even greater had
we focused recall on the defendant's characteristics.
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Secondary Analyses
We included measures of three individual differences—need for
cognition, personal need for structure, and negative mood—that
could have led participants to process the case information more
systematically and, as a result, to avoid an undue influence of the
stereotype information. These individual differences could provide
an alternative explanation for our causal uncertainty results, or
they potentially could moderate the obtained causal uncertainty
findings. Previous research (Edwards et al., 1998; Weary & Ed-
wards, 1994) has found that the CUS is negatively correlated with
need for cognition (n = 105, r = —.42, p < .001) and is positively
correlated with negative affect (n = 71, r = .28, p < .02) and
personal need for structure {n = l\,r= .25, p < .05). Comparable
correlations of the CUS with these other scales were obtained
(NCS, r= - .28 ,p<.001;DES, r= 35, p < .001; PNS, r = .13,
p = .08).
Three separate simultaneous regression analyses were con-
ducted. In these analyses, the guilt likelihood ratings were re-
gressed on the standardized continuous CUS scores, the effects-
coded stereotype information condition variable, and standardized
continuous scores from one of the three other measures. In addi-
tion, each model included all of the two- and the three-way
interactions. In all three analyses, the only significant predictor of
guilt likelihood ratings was the Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype
Information interaction (/3s ranged from —.40 to —.30, fs[163] =
-2.20 to -2.84, ps = .03 to .005). None of the other predictors
were significant (ps > .18). Finally, when CUS scores were not
included in the regression equation, none of the two-way interac-
tions of stereotype and NCS, DES, or PNS scores was significant
(for NCS, DES, PNS, /3s = .19, - .06, - .14, andps = .12, .65, .27,
respectively).
Motivation to Process
Although past research (e.g., Pelham & Neter, 1995) has found
that perceivers' self-reports of their motivation to process social
information often are inconsistent and unreliable, in Study 1, we
included a question used by Bodenhausen et al. (1994) to tap
participants' desires to form an accurate impression of the target's
guilt. Because participants had been told in our study that we were
interested in students as disciplinary decision makers and that they
would be asked questions about the case summary, we asked them
to indicate on an 11-point scale the degree to which they felt
accountable for their judgments. We did not expect the mere
presence of target-category information to arouse greater levels of
accuracy motivation (although it might well result in greater acti-
vation of other types of motivations—namely self-presentational
or social desirability concerns—a point to which we will return in
the General Discussion). Instead, we expected only a main effect
of causal uncertainty beliefs on this measure. A regression analysis
including standardized CUS scores, the stereotype information
condition variable, and the interaction term revealed a main effect
of causal uncertainty, /3 = .33, t(167) = 2.10, p < .04. Participants
with chronic, global causal uncertainty beliefs felt more account-
able than did those without such beliefs, regardless of the presence
or absence of the category label.
Discussion
The results obtained for Study 1 were consistent with the notion
that individuals for whom accuracy concerns were likely to be
active would process the available social information in a thought-
ful and systematic, rather than a heuristic, fashion. That is, the
judgments of the target's guilt made by participants who possessed
more chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs showed no
influence of the available stereotype information. However, the
judgments made by participants who did not possess such beliefs
showed the expected use of the stereotype; they judged the target
as more guilty in the stereotype compared to the no-stereotype
condition.
The obtained interaction of causal uncertainty beliefs and ste-
reotype availability was not accounted for nor was it moderated by
three correlates of causal uncertainty—need for cognition, state
affect, or the personal need for structure. In fact, even when
participants' causal uncertainty levels were not controlled, the
interactions of these correlates with stereotype information avail-
ability were not observed. Although past research using the same
procedure that was used in Study 1 has demonstrated similar weak
or nonexistent effects of need for cognition (Bodenhausen &
Lichtenstein, 1987; Schaller et al., 1995), moderator effects for
each of the other variables have been found under certain condi-
tions.4 Consequently, some discussion of their current null effects
would seem to be warranted.
First, although Bodenhausen et al. (1994) in several studies have
found that target guilt ratings made by happy compared to neutral
mood people generally are more likely to be influenced by avail-
able stereotype information, it is important to note that this earlier
research entailed a manipulation of mood state. In Study 1, we
simply assessed the natural levels of state affect experienced by
our participants. Consequently, it seems likely that the levels of
positive affect and, as a result, the stereotype usage of the current
research participants may well have been less pronounced than in
the Bodenhausen et al. study.
Second, only one study has examined the use of stereotypes by
individuals high and low in the personal need for structure. That
study used a very different paradigm from the one used in Study 1.
More specifically, Neuberg and Newsom (1993) examined the
moderating effects of perceivers' personal needs for structure on
(gender) stereotype usage by asking participants to make trait
ratings for male and female target persons who were behaving
ambiguously. They found that participants who were high in the
personal need for structure made more stereotypic trait ratings of
the targets. It is important to note, however, that initial stereotype
4
 Neuberg and Newsom (1993) noted that their finding of greater ste-
reotyping on the part of high PNS participants was due solely to the PNS
Factor 1 (Desire for Simple Structure). When we analyzed our participants'
guilt ratings and included their scores on the PNS Factor 1, Factor 2
(Response to Lack of Structure), or both Factors 1 and 2 with the stereotype
information variable and their interaction(s) in a regression equation, we
still found no effects involving either of the PNS factors (/3s ranged from
-.16 to .16, and ps ranged from .27 to .93). Also, when the PNS factors
were included with CUS scores in the regression, the Causal Uncertainty X
Stereotype Information interaction remained significant Os = - .34 and
—.33, ps = .01 and < .02, for analyses including Factors 1 and 2,
respectively).
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formation effects found for individuals who are high in the per-
sonal need for structure have been shown to be related more to
categorization than to attributional processes (Schaller et al.,
1995). Because the guilt ratings used in the current research clearly
required both categorization and attributional reasoning (Boden-
hausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985), it may
not be surprising that no stereotype effects associated with the PNS
construct were obtained in the present research.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 supported our arguments that differences
in globality and chronicity of causal uncertainty beliefs and, pre-
sumably, related differences in the chronic accessibility of accu-
racy goals would be associated with differences in the use of
stereotypes. Still, important converging evidence for these argu-
ments could be provided by a demonstration that a similar mod-
eration of stereotype usage by low causal uncertainty participants
results from a direct manipulation of their levels of accuracy
motivation. Accordingly, Study 2 used such a manipulation, in
addition to an assessment of participants' chronic levels of causal
uncertainty.
A second purpose of Study 2 was to assess the effects of goal
importance on stereotype usage. Although the causal uncertainty
model (Weary & Edwards, 1996) predicts that those individuals
who possess chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs
should in general also be more likely to view the goal of accurate
causal understanding as important, it seems possible that these two
variables could be disentangled, at least conceptually (cf. Markus,
1977). That is, it is conceivable that one could be low in causal
uncertainty (i.e., certain of their causal analysis skills) and view the
possession of an accurate understanding of causal relations as a
desirable goal. Alternatively, one could possess chronically acces-
sible causal uncertainty beliefs but still not feel that the possession
of an accurate understanding of the world is generally all that
important. Such an individual might, for example, believe that
events happen because of fate and that no amount of causal
understanding will alter future events.
It seems reasonable to expect that, if general causal understand-
ing is more important for some perceivers, the discrepancy be-
tween current and desired states of causal knowledge should be
more salient and the motivational effects should be magnified.
Indeed, this is a general prediction made by cybernetic control
theories (Hyland, 1988), and it is a specific prediction made by the
causal uncertainty model. Moreover, it should hold regardless of
perceivers' chronic levels of uncertainty. The general importance
of an uncertainty resolution goal, then, like the temporary manip-
ulation of the accuracy goal used in Study 2, should moderate the
motivational effects of causal uncertainty beliefs on stereotype
usage.
In Study 2, we used the same basic procedure and materials as
we used in Study 1. There were, however, two notable alterations.
In addition to the stereotype manipulation, half of the participants
received instructions designed to activate a goal of accurate un-
derstanding; the other half did not. Additionally, we assessed
participants' levels of causal uncertainty and their beliefs in the
general importance of causal understanding for their daily lives.
We predicted a four-way interaction of causal uncertainty, ste-
reotype information, chronic goal importance, and manipulated
accuracy goal. Within the no-accuracy goal conditions we ex-
pected to replicate the Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype Informa-
tion interaction obtained in Study 1 at low, but not high, levels of
goal importance. Within the accuracy goal instruction conditions,
we expected all participants to be highly motivated to process the
available information in a careful and systematic fashion. Thus, we
did not expect to see the influence of stereotypes on guilt ratings,
regardless of participants' levels of causal uncertainty or goal
importance.
Finally, we included measures of two additional individual
differences that have been shown to be associated with causal
uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994, 1996) and which potentially
could lead participants to process the case information more sys-
tematically. Specifically, we examined the relative power of causal
uncertainty, depressive symptomatology, and a sense of personal
control over life events as moderators of stereotype usage.
Method
Participants
In partial fulfillment of their course requirements, 217 introductory
psychology students (139 women, 78 men) participated in this study.
Random assignment by sequential blocks was used to assign participants to
one of two stereotype conditions and one of two goal conditions. Because
they correctly guessed that the true purpose of the experiment was to
investigate stereotyping, 2 female participants were excluded. Conse-
quently, the final analyses were conducted using the remaining 215 par-
ticipants (137 women, 78 men).
Instruments
CUS. The mean CUS score for this sample was 35.92 (SD = 10.39).
To determine if there were any CUS score differences associated with the
manipulated variables, participants' CUS scores were regressed on an
effects-coded goal condition variable (accuracy goal = 1; no goal = — 1),
an effects-coded stereotype condition variable (stereotype = 1; no stereo-
type = -1 ) , and their interaction. No significant effects were obtained
(ps > .16).
Importance of causal understanding. We included an additional item
among several at the end of the CUS to assess the importance of causal
understanding. This item asked participants to indicate on a 6-point rating
scale the degree to which they disagreed or agreed with the following
statement: "Understanding what causes different events in my life is not
crucial for my success and happiness." After participants' responses to this
item were reverse scored, the mean importance rating was 2.68
(SD = 1.51). Participants' ratings of goal importance were, as expected,
related to their CUS scores (r = .21, p = .002), but they were unrelated to
the two manipulated variables and their interaction (ps > .30).
Beck Depression Inventory. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck, 1967) consists of 21 items that are scored on a scale from 0 to 3 and
are summed to provide a total score for the severity of depressive symp-
tomatology. Although the BDI has been shown to be a well-validated
measure of the depth of depressive symptomatology and to be an effective
self-report measure of severity of depression (see Beck, Steer, & Garbin,
1988, for a review of psychometric evidence), it is not a sufficient indicator
of nosologic depression (Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & Ingram,
1987). Thus, scores on this measure and our use of the terms depressed,
depressive, and depression are not meant to imply the presence of clinical
diagnoses of depression. In the current study, the mean BDI score was 6.67
(SD = 6.60). In addition, participants' BDI scores were marginally lower
in the accuracy compared to no-goal condition, /3 = - .13, f(211) = -1.91,
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p < .06. There were no significant effects of stereotype information or of
the Goal X Stereotype Information interaction on BDI scores (ps > .40).
Sense of Control Scale. A modification of Mirowsky and Ross's
(1991) Sense of Control Scale (SCS) was used to assess participants'
perceptions of lack of control. We altered the response format for the scale
from the original four response options ( - 2 = strongly disagree to 2 =
strongly agree) to the 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree response
format of the CUS. After four of the items were reverse scored, partici-
pants' ratings on the eight items were summed; higher scores indicated
greater perceived uncontrollability (for evidence regarding the scale's
psychometric properties and construct validity, see Edwards, Jacobson, &
Weary, 1995; Jacobson et al., 1999; Mirowsky, 1995; Ross & Mirowsky,
1992). The SCS mean for the current sample was 19.23 (SD = 5.27).
Additionally, there were no significant SCS score differences as a function
of goal or stereotype information conditions (ps > .24).
Procedure
The procedure used in Study 2 was identical to that used in Study 1, with
one exception. Immediately prior to reading the case summary, participants
in the accuracy goal conditions were given instructions designed to activate
accuracy concerns. These instructions were adapted from E. P. Thompson,
Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, and Bargh (1994) and from Bodenhausen et
al. (1994). They were as follows:
We also are concerned with people's accuracy in assessing these
cases. That is, we are interested in the thoroughness of the way you go
about making your decision or judgments about guilt and innocence as
well as the appropriate punishments for different types of misbehav-
ior. In this experiment, you will be asked to read about a case in which
a student has been accused of some offense. The case was selected
from another university, so it will in all likelihood be unfamiliar to
you. After reading the brief case summary, simply answer the ques-
tions provided. Bear in mind that you will be held accountable for
your judgment, just as if you were a judge on a real peer discipline
panel. That is, you will have to be able to explain and justify the
decisions that you make about the case you read.
After reading and answering questions about the case and the accused
student, all participants completed the CUS and SCS in random order and
then completed the BDI.
To simplify interpretation of the four-way interaction, we con-
ducted tests of the simple slopes of the stereotype condition lines
for three levels of causal uncertainty (high, moderate, and low) for
each combination of goal (accuracy or no goal) by importance
(high, moderate, or low). The regression weights for all 18 lines
are presented in Table 1.
In the accuracy goal conditions, there was no evidence of
stereotyping (all ps > .33). That is, regardless of the level of
importance, the guilt ratings of high, moderate, and low causal
uncertainty participants who received the stereotype information
did not differ from those who did not receive this information.
In the no-goal condition, there also was no stereotype effect at
high importance levels (ps > .20) or for moderate causal uncer-
tainty participants who rated the importance of causal understand-
ing as moderate or low (ps > .18). However, low causal uncer-
tainty participants in the stereotype compared to those in the
no-stereotype information condition rated the student as more
likely to be guilty when they also perceived the importance of
causal understanding to be low, /3 = 1.64, t(\99) = 3.29,p = .001,
or moderate, j3 = .65, r(199) = 2.20, p < .03. In contrast, at low
to moderate levels of importance, the high causal uncertainty
participants in the stereotype compared to the no-stereotype infor-
mation condition rated the student as less likely to be guilty at low
importance, /3 = - .96, r(199) = -2.38, p = .02, and at moderate
importance levels, j3 = - .64, f(199) = -2 .21, p = .03. Although
not predicted, these latter findings may be suggestive of overcor-
rection for the stereotype information by high causal uncertainty
participants who do not feel that causal understanding is, in gen-
eral, that important to them.
Secondary Analyses
Both BDI and SCS scores were significantly correlated with the
CUS scores (rs = .28 and .46, respectively, ps < .01). To rule out
participants' levels of depression or a lack of personal control as
potential explanations for the causal uncertainty results obtained in
Study 2, we conducted two additional regression analyses. These
Results
Measure of Perceived Guilt
A regression analysis was used to examine whether causal
uncertainty, the importance of causal understanding, and the goal
manipulation interacted to moderate the influence of stereotype
information on participants' guilt judgments. The model consisted
of standardized continuous CUS scores and importance ratings,
effects-coded stereotype information and goal conditions, plus all
of the interactions as predictors of guilt likelihood ratings. As in
Study 1, the Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype Information inter-
action was significant, j3 = - .34, f(199) = -2.32, p = .02. Three
of the three-way interactions also were significant: Causal Uncer-
tainty X Stereotype Information X Goal, /3 = .31, r(199) = 2.11,
p = .04; Causal Uncertainty X Goal X Importance, /3 = .28,
f(199) = 1.96, p = .05; and Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype
Information X Importance, 0 = - .30, f(199) = -2 .11, p = .04.
These effects, however, were qualified by the predicted Causal
Uncertainty X Stereotype Information X Goal X Importance
interaction, /3 = .36, r(199) = 2.53, p = .01.
Table 1
Effects of Causal Uncertainty, Processing Goal, and Goal
Importance on the Use of Stereotype Information in Guilt
Likelihood Judgments (Regression Coefficients)































Note. Significant positive coefficients are evidence of stereotyping (i.e.,
higher guilt ratings in the stereotype condition compared to the no-
stereotype condition), nonsignificant coefficients are indicative of no ste-
reotyping, and significant negative coefficients may be evidence of over-
correction for the stereotype information.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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equations consisted of standardized continuous CUS scores and
importance of causal understanding ratings, effects-coded stereo-
type and goal condition variables, and standardized continuous
scores from one of the two other measures. In addition, each model
included all of the interactions. There were no significant effects
involving either SCS or BDI (ps > .08); in these analyses, the
Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype Information X Goal X Impor-
tance interaction remained at least marginally significant (for BDI
and SCS analyses,.interaction |3s = .43 and .36, rs[183] = 2.67
and 1.90, ps = .008 and < .06, respectively). Additionally, when
CUS scores were not included in the regression equation, neither
the three- nor the four-way interactions involving BDI or SCS .
scores were significant (j3s ranged from —.08 to .18, ps ranged
from .22 to .92).
Motivation to Process
In an attempt to provide converging evidence for the motiva-
tional underpinnings of participants' processing of the available
information, in Study 2 we asked participants to indicate on an
11-point scale how motivated they were to come to a judgment
about the case quickly. A regression analysis involving all main
effects of causal uncertainty, stereotype information, goal, chronic
goal importance, and all interactions was conducted. This analysis
revealed a significant main effect of causal uncertainty such that
high causal uncertainty participants indicated less motivation to
arrive at quick judgments, j3 = - .37, t(\99) = -2.17, p = .03.
Moreover, it also yielded a significant Causal Uncertainty X Goal
interaction, /3 = - .37, f(199) = -2.13, p < .04. Tests of the
simple slopes indicated that high, but not moderate or low, causal
uncertainty participants were significantly less motivated to make
a quick decision in the accuracy compared to no-goal conditions,
j3 = - .58, r(199) = -2.66, p < .01. Although we had expected a
main effect of goal condition, these results provide at least partial
support for high causal uncertainty participants' willingness to
expend cognitive effort in the avoidance of stereotype-based judg-
ments, particularly in the accuracy goal conditions.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 were consistent with predictions and with
the results of Study 1. In the no-goal conditions, only for partici-
pants low in chronic causal uncertainty and low to moderate in the
general importance of causal understanding did the availability of
stereotype information exert an influence on judgments of the
target's guilt. The judgments of those participants who were high
in chronic causal uncertainty concerns, who valued highly the goal
of causal understanding, or whose accuracy motivation had been
heightened by the situational goal manipulation were not so influ-
enced. Finally, no moderation of stereotype or causal uncertainty
effects by participants' levels of depressive symptomatology or
personal control was observed.
Study 3
In the first two studies, we examined the moderation of stereo-
type usage by individual differences in participants' chronically
accessible causal uncertainty beliefs. To be sure, such individual
differences are the major focus of Weary and Edwards's (1996)
causal uncertainty model. Those authors also noted, however, that
causal uncertainty beliefs should be available for all people. The
motivational sequelae of belief activation, then, should follow
even for those individuals who possess available, but not chroni-
cally accessible, causal uncertainty beliefs. Although such beliefs
should be more circumscribed and less extreme because of less
frequent activation, once activated by contextual factors, the de-
rivative cognitive-motivational effects should be observable.
In Study 3, we attempted to activate with a priming procedure
the available, but not necessarily chronically accessible, causal
uncertainty beliefs of half of our participants in the stereotype and
no-stereotype information conditions. The other participants were
exposed to a neutral priming procedure. In addition, we assessed
the chronicity of participants' causal uncertainty beliefs. We ex-
pected that in neutral prime conditions, the guilt ratings of partic-
ipants who scored low but not high on the CUS would be greater
under stereotype than no-stereotype information conditions. In the
causal uncertainty prime conditions, however, we expected no
greater reliance on the stereotype information by those participants
who scored low than by those who scored high on the CUS. That




In partial fulfillment of their course requirements, 132 introductory
psychology students (88 women, 44 men) participated in Study 3. Random
assignment by sequential blocks was used to assign participants to one of
two stereotype conditions and to one of two priming conditions. Three
female participants were excluded because they correctly guessed that the
purpose of the experiment was to investigate stereotyping. Consequently,
the final analyses were conducted using the remaining 129 participants (85
women, 44 men).
Procedure
With the exception of the additional priming manipulation (Weary &
Jacobson, 1999; Williams, 1993), the procedure was similar to that used in
Study 1. Participants were scheduled in groups of 3, but they completed all
of the experimental tasks in separate rooms. On their arrival, a female
experimenter explained to the participants that because she had some extra
time in her study, they would be engaging in two separate experiments. The
first study was an investigation of memory processes and, for that exper-
iment, they would be receiving their instructions via audiotape from the
male experimenter who was conducting it. Participants were instructed that
as soon as they were shown to a room they should press the play button on
the tape recorder to begin working on the experiment.
At the beginning of the tape, participants were told that they would be
memorizing a list of 10 sentences for 4 minutes and that they later would
be asked to recall these sentences. One set of 10 sentences constituted the
causal uncertainty prime and consisted of two filler sentences ("In my
experience, the timing of things sometimes can turn a disadvantage into an
advantage" and "It is difficult for anyone to resist my reasonable re-
quests"), plus the eight items that loaded the highest on the one-factor
solution for the CUS (Weary & Edwards, 1994). The other set of 10
sentences consisted of the two fillers plus eight additional neutral state-
ments that had been pretested and found to have no causal uncertainty or
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gender differences in terms of their favorability or how characteristic they
were of participants.5
To study the sentences, participants were directed to remove the index
cards from the envelope that had been placed on the desk prior to their
arrival. One sentence had been typed on each of the 10 cards. After 4
minutes, the male experimenter told the participants to return the cards to
the envelope and to open the door of the room. They then exchanged the
envelope containing the index cards for a larger one that contained the
remaining tasks. This other envelope contained color-coded sheets of paper
in matching folders that also were numbered sequentially to assist partic-
ipants in finding and completing the next three tasks.
After 30 seconds had expired, the male experimenter asked the partici-
pants to remove the red folder from inside the envelope and to take out the
pink sheet. This sheet indicated that the experimenter was interested in
their memory for new, as well as familiar, information. They then were
instructed to list as many states in the United States as they could remem-
ber before time expired. After working on this filler task for 1 minute, they
were directed to return the pink sheet to the red folder and to place it back
in the envelope.
Next, participants were instructed to remove the blue folder from the
envelope. They were informed that they now would be asked to recall the
sentences they had memorized earlier and that they should take out the blue
sheet contained in the blue folder. All 10 sentences were listed on this
sheet; however, each sentence was missing four to six words that were
represented in the sentences by blank lines. The participants were asked to
write in the missing words.6 Because they were given an unlimited time to
complete this portion of the experiment, they were told to turn off the tape
until they had finished the task. When they restarted the tape, the male
experimenter asked them to put the blue sheet in the blue folder and to
place it in the envelope.
For the final task, the participants were asked to remove the yellow
folder from the envelope and to take out the yellow sheet. This last exercise
also was intended to serve as a filler task, but it was presented as a test of
spatial memory. Participants were asked to write down directions for
someone who wanted to travel from the building in which the experiment
was being held to the student union. They were given 1 min to complete
this task, after which time they were told to return the yellow sheet to the
yellow folder and to place the folder back in the envelope. Finally, they
were thanked for their participation in the memory experiment and told to
give the envelope containing all three folders to the female experimenter.
When the participants informed the female experimenter that they had
finished with the first experiment, she returned with them to the room in
which they had been working. She turned on the computer monitor and
asked the participants to follow the directions on the screen. The general




Because 8 of the 10 items in the causal uncertainty prime
condition were actual questions from the CUS, participants' scores
were collected at the beginning of the quarter as part of a mass
screening. The mean CUS score was 35.14 (SD = 10.26). To
determine whether randomization had been effective, we con-
ducted a regression analysis. Participants' prescreening CUS
scores were regressed onto effects-coded prime condition variable
(causal uncertainty prime = 1, neutral prime = — 1) and stereotype
information condition variables (stereotype condition = 1, no-
stereotype condition = — 1), and their interaction. There were no
significant effects for this analysis (ps > .40).
Measure of Perceived Guilt
To test whether causal uncertainty moderated the influence of
stereotype information on guilt judgments, we conducted a regres-
sion analysis. The regression model consisted of standardized
continuous CUS scores, effects-coded prime and stereotype infor-
mation condition variables, plus all of the interactions as predictors
of the participants' guilt likelihood ratings. Unlike Studies 1 and 2,
the Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype Information interaction was
not significant (p = .67). Indeed, although the Prime X Stereotype
Information interaction approached conventional levels of signif-
icance, /3 = - .29, r(121) = -1.75, p = .08, the only significant
effect was the Causal Uncertainty X Prime X Stereotype Infor-
mation interaction, j3 = .37, f(121) = 2.01, p < .05.
To simplify interpretation of the three-way interaction, we con-
ducted tests of the simple slopes of the stereotype condition lines
for high, moderate, and low levels of causal uncertainty for each
prime condition (see Table 2 for the regression coefficients).
Within the causal uncertainty prime condition, there were no
significant effects of stereotype information on guilt ratings at any
of the three levels of the CUS, although a marginally significant
slope (p < .09) for low causal uncertainty participants was sug-
gestive of a trend toward overcorrection. In the neutral prime
condition, the slope for the low causal uncertainty participants was
as expected; they judged the target as higher in guilt in the
stereotype compared to the no-stereotype condition. Similarly, the
simple slope for moderate causal uncertainty participants indicated
a significant, positive effect for stereotype information. The simple
slope for the high causal uncertainty participants was, as expected,
not significant.
Secondary Analyses
The SCS and a three-item measure of state affect were admin-
istered in counterbalanced order at the end of Study 3. The affect
items asked participants to indicate on 5-point scales (1 = not at
all, and 5 = extremely) how happy, contented, and satisfied they
were feeling. Because ratings on these items were highly corre-
lated with one another (rs from .52 to .60, ps < .001), they were
averaged to create an index of positive affect (Cronbach's a =
.80). Scores on this index were significantly correlated with the
CUS scores; for the CUS with SCS and affect measures, rs = .18
and - .22, and ps < .02 and .05, respectively.
To try to rule out a lack of personal control or state affect as
potential explanations for the causal uncertainty results obtained in
this study, we conducted two additional regression analyses. These
regression models consisted of standardized continuous CUS
scores, the prime and stereotype information variables, and stan-
5
 Weary and Jacobson (1999) demonstrated that the priming manipula-
tion was effective and that the uncertainty beliefs temporarily activated by
the causal uncertainty prime were specific to uncertainty about causal
understanding, Causal Uncertainty x Prime interaction, /3 = .25,
t(H0) = 2.57, p = .01, and did not generalize to noncausal (frequency)
judgments (all ps > .35).
6
 It is not surprising that given the thematic nature of the primes in the
causal uncertainty prime condition, participants recalled a greater number
of those primes compared to neutral prime sentences, /3 = .56,
/(121) = 2.92, p = .004.
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Table 2
Effects of Causal Uncertainty Scale Scores and Prime Condition
on Stereotype Use in Guilt Likelihood Ratings (Regression
Coefficients)
Level of causal uncertainty
Prime condition Low Moderate High
Causal uncertainty prime - .58 - .14 .31
Neutral prime .73* .44* .15
Note. Significant positive coefficients are evidence of stereotyping (i.e.,
higher guilt ratings in the stereotype condition compared to the no-
stereotype condition), nonsignificant coefficients are indicative of no ste-
reotyping, and significant negative coefficients may be evidence of over-
correction for the stereotype information.
* p < .05.
dardized continuous scores from one of the two other measures. In
addition, each model included all of the two- and three-way
interactions. With the SCS included in the equation, the only
significant effect was the Causal Uncertainty X Prime X Stereo-
type Information interaction (p = .03). For the analysis that
included the state affect index, there was a significant Causal
Uncertainty X Affect X Stereotype Information interaction, j3 =
.44, r(121) = 2.08, p < .04; however, none of the simple slope
tests for the Causal Uncertainty X Stereotype Information inter-
action conducted within levels of affect were significant (all ps >
.14)7 Although the Causal Uncertainty X Prime X Stereotype
Information interaction became marginally significant, j3 = .22,
r(121) = 1.72, p = .087, in this analysis, the simple slope test for
the effect of the stereotype information condition variable re-
mained significant for the moderate causal uncertainty partici-
pants, ^ = .48, t(l2l) = 1.97, p = .05, and was marginally so for
the low causal uncertainty participants, /3 = .87, f(121) = 1.80,
p = .08. Additionally, when CUS scores were not included in the
regression equation, neither of the three-way interactions involving
SCS or state affect scores was significant (for these interaction
terms, both /3s = —.03 andps > .86).
Consequently, it does not appear that either of these two other
variables moderated the influence of stereotype information on
guilt judgments. It also does not appear that control beliefs or state
affect moderated the causal uncertainty or prime results obtained
in our study.
Motivation to Process
To provide converging evidence for the role of accuracy moti-
vation in the moderation of stereotype usage, we included a ques-
tion that asked participants to indicate on an 11-point scale the
degree to which they were motivated to accurately understand the
case. An analysis that included standardized CUS scores, the prime
and stereotype information variables, and the interaction terms
revealed a marginally significant interaction of Causal Uncer-
tainty X Prime, /3 = .32, r(121) = 1.67, p = .098. Subsequent tests
of the simple slopes indicated only that participants who scored
high on the CUS reported greater accuracy motivation in the causal
uncertainty compared to the neutral prime condition, /3 = .54,
/(121) = 2.11,/? = .04. It seems possible that only individuals who
have chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy
goals may have introspective access to the cognitive motivations
underlying their judgmental processes (cf., Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). Such a suggestion would be consistent with Study 2 results
regarding participants' reports of their processing motivations.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 add significantly to those of Studies 1
and 2. Whereas the earlier studies demonstrated reduced use of the
stereotype information by highly motivated participants (i.e., those
high in chronic causal uncertainty beliefs, those for whom causal
certainty is a chronically important goal, or those in accuracy goal
conditions), the results of Study 3 demonstrated a similar reduc-
tion, even among participants whose causal uncertainty beliefs
were not chronically accessible. More specifically, when the avail-
able causal uncertainty beliefs of those participants who scored
low on the CUS were primed, then their judgments indicated no
greater guilt on the part of the student-defendant as a function of
the presence of the stereotype information. Similar results were
obtained for those participants in the causal uncertainty prime
condition who scored at moderate or high levels of causal uncer-
tainty. The causal uncertainty results in the neutral prime condi-
tions of Study 3 were largely consistent with those obtained in the
early studies; low causal uncertainty (and, here, moderate causal
uncertainty) participants relied on the stereotype information in
making their guilt ratings. Finally, as in Studies 1 and 2, secondary
analyses also indicated that neither participants' levels of personal
control nor their levels of state affect accounted for the major
findings of Study 3.
Beyond adding converging evidence for the role of activated
causal uncertainty beliefs in moderating the use of stereotypes, the
current studies also add to existing evidence relevant to key
assumptions of the causal uncertainty model. Recent research
(Edwards & Weary, 2000) using the Stroop paradigm has indicated
that chronic causal uncertainty beliefs, as indexed by high scores
on the CUS, can be modeled as chronically accessible constructs.
The model also holds, however, that causal uncertainty beliefs are
available for all people. It should, then, be possible to activate
temporarily such beliefs and to observe the associated motivational
consequences, even among individuals who are nonchronic for
these beliefs. Study 3 provides the first test of and supportive
evidence for these notions. The theory also suggests that activation
of nonchronic compared to chronic causal uncertainty beliefs re-
quires more salient, detailed, or elaborate situational information.
Future research that varies the strength of primes could provide a
valuable additional test of the chronicity notion.
Meta-Analysis of Studies 1-3
All three studies discussed in this article yielded significant
interactions consistent with our hypotheses that the guilt judg-
7
 We also examined the slopes for all other types of simple effects
involved in this three-way interaction. Only one (marginally) significant
effect was obtained, and that occurred when we examined the Stereotype
Information X Affect interactions within each of the three levels of causal
uncertainty. Specifically, among low causal uncertainty participants, those
with high compared to low positive affect rated the student as more guilty
in the no-stereotype condition, /3 = .73, p < .06.
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ments of low causal uncertainty participants in the absence of
conditions designed to motivate increased processing would show
evidence of stereotype usage, whereas the judgments of high
causal uncertainty participants would not. Still, two of our nine
simple slopes tests actually suggested that high causal uncertainty
participants might, in fact, be showing overcorrection for the
stereotype information. A meta-analysis of our findings, however,
revealed that this overcorrection effect was not significant across
the studies. Specifically, a meta-analysis of the simple slopes for
high causal uncertainty participants across all conditions in each of
the studies yielded an average effect size of r = .05, f(8) = 1.76,
p = .12. Moreover, the test for homogeneity of effect sizes was
nonsignificant, ^ ( 8 , k = 9) = 8.54, p = .38. For low causal
uncertainty participants, an initial analysis revealed significant
heterogeneity of effect sizes, ^ ( 8 , k = 9) = 25.71, p = .001; as
a consequence, a search for potential moderators was initiated. A
particularly likely candidate entailed a grouping of conditions
across studies where we either did or did not expect relatively
greater motivation to process on the part of low causal uncertainty
participants (i.e., where accuracy goals or causal uncertainty be-
liefs would or would not have been activated, and where causal
understanding would or would not have been viewed as impor-
tant). This analysis yielded an average effect size indicative of
significant stereotyping among conditions where relatively little
motivation was expected, average r = .19, f(3) = 12.06, p = .002,
X*(3, k = 4) = 0.62, p = .89. The meta-analysis of the other five
conditions where we expected a priori more systematic processing
on the part of low causal uncertainty participants yielded a mar-
ginally significant average effect size, r = - .06, t(4) = —2.33,
p = .08, x*(4, k = 5) = 2.06, p = .73. These latter results, then,
might suggest that corrections for stereotypes may be less well-
calibrated among participants who typically do not process avail-
able information in a careful, systematic fashion. There is, how-
ever, no reliable evidence that individuals high in causal
uncertainty overcorrect for the stereotype information in their
judgments of the target.8
General Discussion
In three studies, we examined the possible moderation of ste-
reotype usage as a function of activation of chronically or tempo-
rarily accessible causal uncertainty beliefs. In all three, we found
evidence consistent with the notion that activation of such beliefs
was associated with a decreased reliance on the stereotype-relevant
category information. More specifically, we found that only
among participants whose causal uncertainty beliefs had not been
activated were ratings of a defendant's guilt higher when the
stereotype information was available.
Why might activation of available causal uncertainty beliefs be
related to reduced stereotyping? We have suggested that activation
of such beliefs, either by the task instructions or by temporary
primes, activated subjective accuracy concerns, thereby resulting
in a more systematic consideration of all available information.
Indeed, three different checks on our participants' processing
motivations, as well as direct manipulations of their accuracy
concerns, provided some support for this argument. This is partic-
ularly noteworthy given the well-known problems in obtaining
self-reports of such motivations (Pelham & Neter, 1995). But
could there, perhaps, be other, plausible explanations for our
causal uncertainty results?
One possible explanation for our causal uncertainty results
might invoke self-presentational or social desirability concerns.
That is, individuals who score high on the CUS might well be more
attuned to the implications of their target judgments for their
self-image or for others' impressions of them. They, therefore,
might have avoided the use of stereotypes in order to project a
more favorable image of themselves, rather than because of a
tendency to engage in a more systematic and thoughtful processing
of the available information. Indeed, our Study 2 findings of lesser
stereotyping on the part of accuracy goal condition participants
could similarly be explained by their possibly greater social desir-
ability concerns. Although we cannot rule out this possibility with
respect to the accuracy goal findings of Study 2, individual dif-
ferences in causal uncertainty beliefs have been shown to be
unrelated to social desirability (Weary & Edwards, 1994). More-
over, the responses of participants high in causal uncertainty to the
personal control and depression measures used in Study 2 would
suggest that they are more, rather than less, willing to convey
negative impressions of the self.
We also note that a collateral research program (Tobin, Weary,
Wichman, & Jacobson, 2001), using identical general procedures
to the studies reported herein, has found CUS scores to be related
to the Motivation to Control Prejudice Reactions Scale (Dunton &
Fazio, 1997) and to several of the subscale scores of the Need for
Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). However, when
scores from these scales and their subscales were included, along
with CUS scores, in separate regressions predicting participants'
guilt ratings, the interaction of causal uncertainty and stereotyping
that was found in our research was also obtained (ps ranged from
.008 to .02).
A final alternative explanation for our findings might entail not
motivational but response style differences of participants high and
8
 The current research was not conducted with the goal of discovering
the reason for any baseline (no stereotype) differences in high and low
causal uncertainty individuals' ratings of the student's level of guilt.
However, in two out of nine instances, the ratings of our high compared to
low causal uncertainty participants were significantly higher. It is not
surprising that an initial meta-analysis indicated significant heterogeneity
of effect sizes, ^ ( 8 , k = 9) = 15.39, p = .05. A subsequent meta-analysis
of the results of the conditions where a priori we would have expected
cognitive effort to differ as a function of participants' causal uncertainty
levels (i.e., where accuracy goals or causal uncertainty beliefs would not
have been activated, and where causal understanding would not have been
viewed as important) yielded a significant average effect size, average r =
.14, r(3) = 5.64, p < .02, ^ ( 3 , k = 4) = 1.07, p = .78. A similar analysis
was not significant for those conditions where no such differences were
expected, average r = - .04, f(4) = .85, p = .45, ^ ( 4 , k = 5) = 5.15, p =
.27. Although speculative, we would suggest that perhaps high compared
to low causal uncertainty participants characteristically have a tendency,
when they try but fail to find any explanatory organizing theme underlying
the available social information (i.e., no stereotype), to attribute the target's
behavior to an inherent deficiency in his or her personality. Such a
possibility would be consistent with their generally greater need to see the
world as predictable. It also would be consistent with suggestions made by
Edwards (1998) that such individuals might under certain conditions fall
back on their default inferences when they feel uncertain about the results
of their effortful processing of the available social information.
CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY AND STEREOTYPES 217
low in causal uncertainty. Specifically, the differences might be
explained in terms of a general tendency for individuals who are
chronically causally uncertain to make more moderate responses
as one possible way of indicating their general judgmental uncer-
tainty. For several reasons, we think this explanation is not par-
ticularly viable. First, previous research (Edwards et al, 1998) has
directly examined the possibility of a general response tendency
and has found no support for it. Moreover, where such judgmental
differences between individuals high and low in causal uncertainty
have been predicted and observed (Edwards, 1998; Edwards et al.,
1998), the attributional judgments made by high causal uncertainty
individuals have been more extreme. Overall, then, it seems more
likely that the lesser influence of stereotype information by high
causal uncertainty participants in all three studies resulted from a
greater willingness to expend cognitive resources in the service of
subjective accuracy goals.
Conclusion
In three studies, we have shown that activation of either chronic
or temporary causal uncertainty beliefs is associated with a lesser
reliance on or use of stereotypes. Additionally, individual differ-
ences in the belief of the importance of possessing an accurate
social understanding and a manipulation of an accuracy goal
produced similar results. These findings, then, are consistent with
the notion that the reduced usage of stereotypes resulted from
participants' desire to avoid making an erroneous, category-based
target judgment. Moreover, the secondary analyses conducted for
all three studies indicate that the effects of causal uncertainty on
stereotype usage uncovered here are not accounted for by its major
cognitive or affective correlates. The results of the current re-
search, then, provide support for several critical arguments of the
causal uncertainty model and for the discriminant validity of the
causal uncertainty scale.
Caveats
In the current research, we have adopted the currently dominant
view of stereotypes as simplistic impressional devices that per-
ceivers may use with minimal cognitive effort expenditure to
render their worlds more understandable, predictable, and control-
lable. We want to point out, however, that several authors (e.g.,
Spears & Haslam, 1997; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997) have
argued that social categorization and stereotyping sometimes may
represent effortful processes. Still others (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon,
1991) have argued that the characterization of stereotyping as
relatively effortless fails to take into account possibly important
resource differences in component processes (activation vs.
application).
Although future research will need to delineate the conditions
under which stereotyping does or does not require cognitive re-
sources, it would appear that there is little controversy surrounding
the fundamental point that the use of categories and stereotypes is
engendered by perceivers' needs to augment the available stimulus
information and thereby to improve social meaning. Two critical
determinants of the use of categories and stereotypes are their
perceived relevance and appropriateness.
Our suggestion that participants whose causal uncertainty be-
liefs are activated should be more likely to avoid the default use of
the category information was premised upon the notion that they
would be more motivated to form the most valid assessment
possible of the target's guilt. Such an assessment would seem to
require an analysis of the diagnosticity, relevance, or appropriate-
ness of particular pieces of information, including the category-
based stereotype information. To the degree that such an analysis
requires some amount of both motivation and ability (cognitive
resources), we would predict in the present paradigm greater
reliance on the target-category cue as the only available (and
probably low-cost) way to enhance the meaning of the case infor-
mation if adequate levels of one or the other are not present.
Although these speculations are consistent with past research on
causal uncertainty and preferences for diagnostic information
(Weary & Jacobson, 1997), future research will need to examine
directly and within the context of the current paradigm the validity
of this notion.
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